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Abstract: 
 
The Global community’s commitment to the goals of economic growth and poverty 
alleviation is an old one. Over the last half century, several United Nations (UN) 
commissions have committed themselves to promotion of growth and development. The 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are  the newest manifestation of the same 
worthy and noble objective. Trade expansion has a strong correlation with growth. 
Although the WTO is not a development institution, its operations have definite 
development relevance. There are certain facets of its mandate that decisively influence 
developmental endeavors of countries. The system of ruled-based conduct provided by 
the WTO reduces uncertainties in the multilateral trade arena, which in turn helps in 
promoting multilateral trade and domestic investment at lower risk. As the Doha Round 
is intended to be a development round, development concerns have remained an integral 
part of the Doha Round. The Group-of-Twenty (G-20) developing economies, which was 
born in Cancún, played a consequential role in the MTNs. No doubt a successful 
culmination of the Doha Round can help in poverty alleviation and achieving the first 
MDG. This article provides a detailed analysis of the growing participation of the 
developing economies in the evolving multilateral trading system. Their expectation is to 
integrate with the global economy and in the process accelerate growth. However, so far 
the task has seemed arduous, progress has been slow and the road appears to be long. 
That being said, a small sub-group of developing economies has managed to integrate 
well with the multilateral trade regime as well as the global economy.    
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DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND THE DOHA 
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 
One of the most important achievements of the last 
ten years has been the enhanced integration of 
developing countries into the WTO system. Never 
before have so many been such active participants in 
the global trading system and the development focus 
of the Doha Round is an appropriate reflection of this. 
…The development dimension can no longer be an 
after thought or an add-on, a sort of pisco you add to 
the main dishes of market opening. Exceptions and 
derogations have their place, but they can too easily 
lock developing countries into the status quo and put 
a ceiling on their future possibilities.   
         —Pascal Lamy. 2006a 
 
1. Global Commitment to Economic Growth 
The commitment and dedication of the global community to the goals of 
economic growth and poverty alleviation is an old one. Over the last half century, 
several United Nations (UN) commissions committed themselves to the 
promotion of growth and development. Two of the notable commissions were 
headed by Lester B. Pearson and Raul Prebisch. Both developing and industrial 
economies were part of these commitments to global economic development. 
The final outcomes of many of these Commissions were creations of worthy 
development institutions like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The most 
recent endeavor of this kind is the enthusiastic accord of the global community 
on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which also it to an expanded 
vision of global development.  While many of the targets were first set out by 
international conferences and summits held in the 1990s, they were eventually 
adopted as the MDGs.  
 
The global community appreciates the moral imperative and development 
rationale of achieving the MDGs, particularly the first one that aims at reducing 
income poverty. Favorable global growth environment helped sustain global 
poverty alleviation endeavors over the 2000-2005 period. Buoyant trade volume 
 4
expansion, low interest rates and strong growth performance in the industrial 
economies helped low- and middle-income developing economies grow at an 
average rate of under 5 percent in 2005, which was well above their historic rates 
(WB, 2006). Macroeconomic indicators in these country groups were markedly 
superior in 2005 than they were over the 1990s, albeit the gains were uneven. 
Much of the improvement was focused in East and South Asia and in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia. During 2000-2005, GDP growth rates in the middle-
income economies have been higher and less volatile than those in the low-
income ones. They also grew more resilient to external shocks.  To be sure, 
there is a great deal of room for improvement.  
 
Advancing the agenda of growth and poverty alleviation within the framework of 
multilateral trade regime, within the mandate of the on-going Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs), is in the commercial and development 
interests of both developing and industrial economies. Failure of the Doha Round 
will indeed risk the near-term prospects for growth in the low- and middle-income 
economies noted above, in the process impairing the global income-poverty 
reduction endeavors. Conversely, a successful conclusion of the Doha Round 
would bolster growth and income-poverty alleviation endeavors. Its successful 
conclusion would also provide a reliable engine of trade-led growth for the global 
economy. However, the MTNs have neither been progressing briskly nor 
smoothly. The major trading powers missed the deadline of April 30, 2006, for 
putting in order an agreement on farm and industrial goods. Failure of the 
Cancún Ministerial Conference of the WTO, lack of any substantive realization in 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, and  subsequently missing the April 30 
strategic deadline by the major trading economies in the MTNs have engendered 
skepticism regarding a successful conclusion of the Doha Round.     
 
Can an improved climate for external trade and multilateral trade regime, in 
agreement with domestic trade policy of the WTO member countries, make any 
contribution to achieving the MDGs and poverty alleviation? Does trade 
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expansion accelerate economic growth in the developing economies? Essentially 
due to its high policy relevance, the latter subject has been extensively 
researched by economists during the preceding quarter century. A library full of 
research is available on this issue. The saving grace is that the large empirical 
literature that was produced around this theme has led both policy mandarins 
and neoclassical economists to generally accept the view that trade expansion, 
together with improvement in human capital, is a key driver of growth and poverty 
alleviation, although there is a question mark on causality.1  
 
Like the MDGs, the global community needs to adopt the policy objectives of 
economic growth and poverty alleviation by means of an ambitious program of 
trade policy reforms. To be sure, such a reform program will need to have an 
ambitious vision and necessarily encompass decoupling of agricultural support, 
including abolition of export subsidies, significant tariff slashing on the most-
favored nation (MFN)-basis on labor-intensive products, which are of interest to 
the exporting firms from the developing economies. This comprehensive reform 
program could cover all the WTO members, both developing and industrial 
economies. Such a reform program has immense potential to become a source 
of welfare gains to the developing economies, and the absolute poor in it.  
 
2. Macroeconomic Policy and the Trade-Growth Nexus 
Because of its immense policy implications, this nexus has been paid a great 
deal of attention by researchers. This subject is not without its contentious 
aspects. While there are sound empirical and theoretical reasons supporting a 
                                                 
1 While there are numerous literature surveys, one of the most recent and eminently readable one 
is Trade, Growth and Poverty:  Selective Survey, by A. Berg and A.O. Krueger (2003). Giles and 
Williams (2000) provided another comprehensive survey of more than 150 export-growth applied 
papers. They described the changes that have occurred, over the last two decades, in the 
methodologies used empirically to examine for relationships between exports and economic 
growth, and provided information on the current findings. The 1990s saw an abundance of time 
series studies that focused on examining for causality via exclusions restrictions tests, impulse 
response function analysis and forecast error variance decompositions. They found that that the 
results of studies examining export-led growth based on standard causality techniques were not 
typically robust to specification or method.  
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move to a more liberalized trade regime, there are equally sound theoretical 
arguments that support protection from international competition for some 
domestic industrial sectors, at least in the initial stages of industrialization. 
Economic theory does not decry infant industry protection. The large body of 
empirical literature, based on comparable methodological approaches, which 
largely entail exploring cross-country evidence at the macroeconomic level, came 
up with conclusions that were far from uniform. Numerous multi-country case 
studies were conducted in the past, which also utilized similar analytical 
frameworks, also came up with results that were not harmonious.2 These 
empirical and statistical studies subsequently became the target of criticism for 
methodological weaknesses.  
 
Intense evaluation by the economics profession of the trade-growth nexus 
brought them to the inference that that in a liberal multilateral trade regime, 
countries that trade more grow faster. The liberalized multilateral trade regime 
and domestic policies are positively correlated with growth. While this was the 
leitmotif of numerous empirical studies conducted over a long period, there was 
no certainty regarding the direction of causality. In addition, this empirical 
evidence of a relationship was not without its controversies. There were 
fundamental problems that permeated them, casting a shadow of doubt over the 
validity of their estimates. For instance, endogeneity bias and omitted variables 
were among the most serious problems with these earlier studies. Due to these 
statistical flaws, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique commonly 
used in the early empirical studies tended to yield biased estimates of the 
coefficient of interest, that is, impact of openness on the GDP growth. Also, mere 
examination of correlation coefficients could not identify the direction of causation 
between trade and growth.   
 
                                                 
2 Principal among the early studies are Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), Balassa (1971) and 
Krueger (1978).  
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Frankel and Romer (1999) suggested a remedy to address the methodological 
weaknesses. Their innovation was to take a size-weighted distance measure 
between countries. Dollar and Kraay (2002) reconstructed this instrument for 
their sample economies and found that there is a highly significant positive effect 
of trade expansion on the per capital income of a developing economy. This 
methodological improvement not only confirmed the results of Frankel and 
Romer (1999) but also yielded larger coefficient than OLS regression analysis. 
Making an inter-temporal distinction, Dollar and Kraay (2002) also inferred that 
trade expansion plays a larger role in the short run on growth than does 
institutional development, which has a greater effect in the longer run.       
 
The improvements in the theory of edogenous growth which took place in the 
latter half of 1980s and early 1990s made a decisive contribution to this debate.3  
The new growth theory was partially based on the relationship between trade and 
growth. Improvements in theory and availability of more comprehensive data 
made it possible to launch more sophisticated cross-country economic analyses 
relating to various measures of “outwardness”, or “outer-orientation” or 
“openness” to the growth rate of GDP and total factor productivity (TFP). These 
studies found a strong positive relationship between outward-looking policies and 
growth. Cross-country evidence at macroeconomic level was once again 
positive.4 Some of these studies further improved the methodology by using 
measures of trade intensity instead of measures of trade policy as the relevant 
variable determining GDP growth. This measure captured more than just the 
influence of policy-induced trade barriers like tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs). Like the earlier empirical studies, this sub set of studies also found that 
more open developing economies grow at a faster GDP growth rate. Like the 
earlier studies, they also did not go unchallenged. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) 
                                                 
3 Reference here is to the well known researches of Paul Romer (1986), Robert Lucas (1988) and 
Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991). 
4 See, for instance, Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Harrison (1996) and Edwards 
(1998). 
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not only questioned the robustness of their results but also regarded the “search 
for such a relationship futile”.    
Dollar and Kraay (2004) examined the effect of liberalization, trade expansion 
and globalization on growth, inequality and poverty. Over half the developing 
country population presently lives in globalizing economies that have seen large 
increases in trade and significant declines in policy-induced trade barriers, both 
at the domestic and multilateral levels. These developing economies are catching 
up with the industrial countries, while the rest of the developing world is falling 
farther behind. Second, they examined the effects on the poor. The increase in 
growth rates leads on average to proportionate increases in incomes of the poor. 
The evidence from individual cases and cross-country analysis supports the view 
that promotion of trade and globalization leads to faster growth and poverty 
reduction in poor countries. 
Following the post-war performance of the Japanese economy, the four East 
Asian dragon economies (Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan) and Southeast Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand) turned to the traded goods sector to function as an engine of 
growth. Adoption of outward-orientation helped these economies achieve stellar 
economic performances, which turned Asia into the most dynamic region of the 
global economy (Das, 2005). The hopeful showcase of the Asian economies has 
been analyzed endlessly. From the Asian scenario, lessons were sought for the 
other developing economies. Thinking in the academe and policy-making 
institutions like the Bretton Woods twins and the WTO markedly shifted in favor 
of an outer-orientated growth strategy and liberal global trade regime.  
 
Disagreements among the researchers apart, a number of cross-country studies 
have supported the trade-growth nexus. It is increasingly believed in the policy-
making community that protectionist environment promotes and perpetuates 
inefficient industries in the developing economies. Also, protectionist policies 
were usually combined with inflexible industrial regulations and over-valued 
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exchange rates. South Asian and Latin American developing economies testify to 
these facts. Trade does not stimulate growth in developing economies with 
excessive regulations (Bolaky and Freund, 2004). While the strategy of inward-
oriented or import-substituting industrialization can stimulate domestic 
production, it suffers from obvious and severe anti-export, anti-labor and anti-
agriculture biases. Consequently, developing economies that adopt this growth 
strategy were deterred from specializing in accordance with their perceived 
comparative advantage.     
 
Both static and dynamic effects of trade expansion on the domestic economy are 
well known. The static effects work through efficiency in resource allocation in the 
domestic economy, while the dynamic ones work by transporting growth-
enhancing factors like technological advances and knowledge. The dynamic 
effects are divided into the following five categories, namely, spillover effects, 
scale-economies effects, competition generated effects, imitation effects and 
increased variety of intermediation (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001). Little wonder 
that efficiency gains are directly correlated with the liberalization of trade policy in 
the developing economies and liberalizing multilateral trading environment and 
that TFP gains are regarded as one of the standard outcomes of trade expansion 
(Bernard and Jensen. 1999). 
 
3. Development Relevance of the Multilateral Trade Regime  
The definitions of the multilateral trade regime and the WTO clarify that it is not a 
development institution. The GATT/WTO system was originally not designed for 
economic development. That being said, efforts to enhance the development 
relevance of the WTO have constantly been made. There are certain facets of its 
mandate that decisively influence developmental endeavors of countries 
consciously striving to climb the ladder of growth, development and 
industrialization. The two quintessential functions of the WTO regime are:  (i) 
negotiating commitments for improving market access, and (ii) establishing a 
rule-based trading system that leaves no element of unpredictability in 
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multilateral trade. These are two critically important dimensions and the 
developing economies can benefit from both of them. First, as noted above, 
domestic policy stance of openness is associated with brisk growth and poverty 
alleviation. If the WTO ensures greater market access for the developing 
economies, the ones that have reformed and liberalized their domestic policies 
and put a compensatory policy structure in place are sure to experience 
acceleration in their growth performance. Tariffs and NTBs work as a tax on 
development. This observation applies to both developing and industrial 
economies (Das, 2001).5 Secondly, the majority of the developing economies are 
relatively weaker players in the multilateral trading system. By conceiving, 
designing and establishing a rule-based multilateral trade regime the WTO 
protects the interests of developing economies, particularly the smaller traders, 
that have little ability to influence the policies of the dominant players in the world 
trade arena.  
 
A system of common rules and mutually agreed codes of conduct among the 
WTO members can reduce uncertainties among trading partners by placing 
boundaries on the policies adopted by members. This in turn helps in promoting 
domestic investment at lower risk. It has been observed that the private sector 
shies away from investing if a rule-based trade discipline and commensurate 
domestic reforms are in doubt because investors perceive it as a high-risk 
environment. A framework of multilateral agreements renders the domestic policy 
measure more credible. Such a framework also renders domestic policy reversal 
or backsliding impossible because for all appearances they are locked in with a 
multilateral agreement.  
Although not the naissance, the evolution of the multilateral trade regime took 
place in an oblique and prejudiced manner during the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) era. During this period, the developing economies were 
not significant traders and did not actively participate in the MTNs. Therefore, the 
                                                 
5 Refer to Das (2001), in particular Chapter 1. 
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multilateral trade regime evolved to reflect the perceived interest of the industrial 
economies. Many early GATT rules reflected the practices that were being 
followed in the industrial economies. Heavily subsidized production and export of 
agriculture in the industrial economies and distortion in trade in agricultural 
products was considered acceptable because it suited the interests of the 
industrial economies. The same logic applies to binding of trade in textiles and 
apparels in quotas, an anathema according to the GATT rules.  
This was not only true of the past practices but has also persisted until the 
present. Many recent laws adopted under the new WTO regime still reflect the 
interests of and practices followed in the industrial economies. For instance, the 
WTO rules on the protection of intellectual property rights are the very same laws 
that are followed in the industrial economies. This implies that while the 
developing economies are obliged to create a new regulatory framework on 
intellectual property rights, the status quo continues in the industrial economies. 
No changes are required by the WTO in their intellectual property rights 
regulations.6          
During the early rounds of MTNs, developing economies did not participate 
actively. They were minor trading economies and watched the negotiations from 
the sidelines rather than participating in them proactively. During the mid-1980s, 
many developing economies, particularly the large ones, began implementing 
far-reaching macroeconomic reform and restructuring programs. Their principal 
objective was to increase and diversify their exports and economies.  This was 
regarded as an instrument for integrating into the global economy. These reforms 
began showing tangible results in several developing economies, which were 
visible in rising export volumes. Therefore, the Uruguay Round (1986-94) saw a 
radical change in the mindset of policy-makers in the developing economies. The 
old GATT mindset was transformed. During and after the Uruguay Round the 
developing economies became proactive participants in the MTNs. An increasing 
                                                 
6 This part draws on Chapter 6 of the Global Economic Prospects (2004) published by the World 
Bank. See pp. 205-231.  
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number of them pari passu became more proactively involved in multilateral 
trade.  
During the decade of 1990s, developing economies recorded an average 
merchandise export growth rate which was one-third higher than that of the 
industrial economies. In the space of one decade, the average trade-to-GDP 
ratio for the developing economies soared from 29 percent to 43 percent (Ingco 
and Nash, 2004). The year 2004 saw a marked increase in the share of 
developing economies in world trade to 31 percent, the highest ever. This was 
essentially due to increases in their share of the export of manufactures. In 2004, 
they accounted for 28 percent of world exports of manufactures. Considering the 
fact that this share was only 22 percent in 1995, this was a significant 
achievement. Some developing economies like China and several Asian 
economies have made successful niches in the global trade scenario. In 2004 
China overtook the US as the world's largest exporter of advanced-technology 
products like laptop computers, information technology products, cellular phones 
and digital cameras. In 2003, the US was the global leader in this category with 
exports of $137 billion, followed by China with $123 billion. In 2004, China 
notched up another first. It exported $180 billion worth of high-technology 
equipment in 2004, compared to the US exports of $149 billion, making China 
the leading global economy in the exports of high-technology products (Das, 
2006).  
While this group of developing economies gave reason to be optimistic about 
their future, the fact remains that still only a small number of them have so far 
benefited from the expansion in trade. The 50 least developed countries (LDCs) 
account for about 1 percent of world trade. The share of sub-Saharan countries 
was 2 percent in 2005. The developing economies that benefited from the 
multilateral trading system and have integrated into the global economy are 
those that pursued sound macroeconomic policies, including open trade and 
investment regimes.  
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Thus viewed, over the last decade several developing economies have emerged 
as important trading economies. With the progressive involvement of the 
developing economies, a new goal needed to become part of the WTO 
deliberations and negotiations, namely economic growth and development. The 
implications of the new WTO rules are to be carefully evaluated. They should be 
so designed that they proactively lead a member developing economy to the new 
growth target. Economic growth is indeed a difficult metaprocess, which inter alia 
requires active, and educated involvement of the developing economies in the 
multilateral trading system.  
In the recent past, the developing economies have been more successful in 
exporting manufactured goods than agricultural products. This is partly due to the 
idiosyncrasies of the multilateral trade regime. During the two decades ending in 
2001, multilateral trade growth in agriculture and manufacturing trade took place 
at similar paces. Table 1 shows that exports of agricultural products from 
developing economies rose in the 1990s, so did the growth rate of manufacturing 
products. However, these statistics conceal an important difference. During the 
period under consideration, developing countries’ exports of agricultural products 
to other developing economies more than doubled, while those to industrial 
economies stagnated. Consequently, the share of developing countries’ 
agricultural exports to other developing countries increased from 9.5 percent to 
13.4 percent during the 1980-2001 period. Over the same period, their share of 
agricultural exports to industrial economies declined from 25.8 percent to 22.9 
percent. Conversely, their share of manufactured goods exports to industrial 
economies soared from 12.7 percent in 1980-81 to 15.2 percent in 1990-91, and 
further to 21.1 percent in 2000-01. This set of simple statistics portend to the fact 
that trade barriers have been more effective in stifling agricultural exports from 
the developing economies than manufacturing exports. This trend in turn reflects 
the idiosyncratic nature of the present multilateral trade regime.           
Table 1 
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Export Growth Rates in Constant (1995) Dollars 
(In percent) 
    World Export   Developing Countries 
    Growth Rates  Export Growth Rates 
   1980-1990   1990-2001  1980-1990   1990-2001 
Agriculture       4.5       3.6        3.5        4.8 
Manufacturing       5.9       4.8        7.6        8.9 
________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Computed by Ingco and Nash (2004) from COMTRADE date tapes.  
 
Participation of the developing economies in the multilateral forum is 
progressively becoming more consequential. The Group-of-twenty (G-20) which 
was born during the Cancún Ministerial Conference, not only played a 
consequential role in Cancún Ministerial Conference but also at the WTO 
meeting in Geneva, held in the last week of July 2004, which put together the 
July Package or the July Framework Agreement.7 For the members of the G-20, 
one lesson learned at Cancún was that to avoid later frustrations they need to 
approach future ministerial conferences, MTNs and other important WTO 
meetings with well beefed-up teams of trade economists and better preparations 
for negotiations. For the most meaningful and salutary outcomes, their degree of 
                                                 
7 The G-20 achieved in Geneva what they could not in Cancún. 
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preparations for the future MTNs should be on the lines of the delegations of the 
Quadrilateral (or Quad) countries.8  
 
4. A Developmental Round: Abiding by the Basic Principles  
The Doha Round of MTNs was christened the development round by the WTO 
secretariat.  Lamy (2006b) noted that this was done in recognition of the fact that 
“there remains, in today’s multilateral trading system’s rules and disciplines, 
imbalances that penalize developing economies—and this must be corrected.” 
The intention in naming it a development round was to try to improve the 
multilateral disciplines and commitment by all members of the WTO in such a 
manner that they “establish a more level playing field and provide developing 
countries with better conditions to enable them to reap the benefits of trade 
liberalization.” It is safe and fair to assume that it was expected that the final 
outcome of this round will have development implications. Developmental 
concerns formed an integral part not only of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
(December 2001) but also of the subsequent July Package (July 31, 2004) or the 
framework agreement.  
 
The General Council rededicated the WTO members to fulfilling the development 
dimension of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), which places the needs and 
interests of developing and least-developed countries (LDCs) at the heart of the 
Doha Work Program.9 The General Council reiterated the “important role that 
                                                 
8 Canada, the European Union (EU), Japan and the United States (US) are the four Quadrilateral 
(or Quad) countries 
9 Fifty countries are presently designated by the United Nations as “least developed countries” 
(LDCs). The list is reviewed every three years by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of 
the United Nations. In its latest triennial review in 2003, the ECOSOC used the following three 
criteria for the identification of the LDCs, which were proposed by the Committee for 
Development Policy (CDP): (i) a low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of 
the gross domestic product per capita (under $750 for inclusion, above $900 for graduation); (ii) a 
human resource weakness criterion, involving a composite Augmented Physical Quality of Life 
Index (APQLI) based on indicators of: (a) nutrition; (b) health; (c) education; and (d) adult literacy; 
and (iii) an economic vulnerability criterion, involving a composite Economic Vulnerability Index 
(EVI) based on indicators of: (a) the instability of agricultural production; (b) the instability of 
exports of goods and services; (c) the economic importance of non-traditional activities (share of 
manufacturing and modern services in GDP); (d) merchandise export concentration; and (e) the 
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enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed 
technical assistance and capacity building programs can play in the economic 
development of these countries” (WTO, 2004) . The ninth round under the aegis 
of the GATT/WTO system, the Doha Round, promises a new direction to the 
MTNs and calls for a new mindset among negotiators from both industrial and 
developing economies. It is time to banish the ghosts of mercantilism and set 
these negotiations firmly on the path of shared global economic growth.    
For the developing economies, gains from trade integration are acknowledged to 
be far larger than any probable increase in external assistance flows. A pro-
development outcome of the Doha Round is sure to provide developing 
economies an opportunity and incentive to use trade integration proactively as a 
growth lever. It will also go a long way in establishing the development credibility 
of the present trade regime in general as well as the WTO in particular. To 
ensure that the Development Round remains a Development Round, the WTO 
members need to run some checks and balances over what is currently 
transpiring in the MTNs. Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) devised four litmus tests of 
whether the negotiations, agreements and decisions are pro-development or not. 
These four principles are: (i) the agreement’s future impact on development 
should be assessed objectively. If there are possibilities of it being negative, then 
it is unfit for inclusion in the DDA, (ii) the agreement should be fair (iii) fairly 
arrived at, and (iv) the agreement should be confined to trade-related and 
development-friendly areas, and not venture outside into non-trade-related areas 
on the pretext that they have an indirect bearing on trade.  
Little economic analysis was done in the past for the potential impact of individual 
WTO agreements on member country or country groups. Analytical studies that 
were attempted did not penetrate into the core of negotiations, which largely 
remained based on prevailing orthodoxies. They were also influenced by 
                                                                                                                                                 
handicap of economic smallness (as measured through the population in logarithm); and the 
percentage of population displaced by natural disasters. 
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lobbying from strong interest groups. For quantifying the potential impact of each 
agreement, computable general equilibrium (CGE) exercises can indeed be 
useful. They are an excellent tool for quantifying the potential impact. Modeling 
frameworks like the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) and its variations have 
been in frequent use by scholars and professional economists for the purpose of 
reckoning the impact. The GTAP project is coordinated by the Center for Global 
Trade Analysis, which is housed in the Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Purdue University. The Center for Global Trade Analysis undertakes applied 
general equilibrium (AGE) modeling, and provides services to other AGE 
modelers as well as supranational organizations using AGE-based analysis. The 
objective of GTAP is to improve the quality of quantitative analysis of global 
economic issues within an economy-wide framework. Since its inception in 1993, 
GTAP has rapidly become a common “language” for many of those conducting 
global economic analysis. Economists at the University of Michigan and Perdue 
University have a great deal of experience, spanning over a decade, in running 
these comprehensive simulation exercises. Given the availability of this 
technique, the WTO Secretariat could be assigned the responsibility of 
conducting general equilibrium incidence analyses, which they can produce with 
the help of academic scholars in this area. These empirical studies can quantify 
the impact of different proposals on different countries or country groups. 
However, it should be ensured that the CGE and AGE models used remain 
sensitive to this differentiation.   
Fairness of agreements is as important as it is problematical and conflict-ridden. 
It is basically a tricky concept. Economic circumstances of each one of the 150 
WTO members are different, therefore, each WTO agreement impacts upon 
each of the members in a different manner.10 In terms of net gains measured as 
                                                 
10 During the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Hong Kong, (15 December 2005) 
members approved Tonga’s terms of accession. This decision paves the way for the South 
Pacific Island nation to become the 150th member of the Organization. The Kingdom of Tonga 
will be the fourth Pacific Island State to join the WTO after Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the 
Solomon Islands. Vietnam’s accession negotiations were in the final stage during the first quarter 
of 2006.  
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percentage of GDP, if any agreement that hurts one country group and benefits 
the other, it is considered unfair by the one that is hurt. Fairness also has an 
element of progressiveness, that is, the largest benefits of an agreement should 
accrue to the poorest group of member developing countries. So defined, 
fairness has not been a part of the multilateral trading regime thus far. This 
concept of fairness applies to the entire package of WTO agreements, not to 
individual agreements. The package has to be viewed and adjudged in its 
entirety.  In case of individual agreements, there necessarily has to be some 
leeway in making give and take. This effect of the WTO agreements is inevitable, 
therefore, one needs to look at the bottom line in this regard and reckon which 
country, or country group, is benefiting or losing on balance.    
Procedural fairness or justice is the principle that deals with the transparency of 
the negotiations process. Historically, transparency was not part of the culture of 
the GATT system, which was known for its lack of transparency, reflected in the 
Green Room process. Its lack of transparency became one of the destructive 
features during the Seattle Ministerial Conference. It is apparent that setting an 
agenda will have a large bearing over the final outcome of the MTNs. Therefore, 
participating members having a say in the mapping of agenda is essential. As 
many opinions and stances as possible need to be taken into account before the 
agenda of an MTN is finalized. In the past, a lack of transparency often allowed 
the large and powerful trading economies to ride rough shod over the system. 
After the debacle at Seattle, the issue of transparency in the WTO system made 
visible and impressive strides. The “July Package”, also known as the July 
Framework Agreement, which was finalized on the 31 of July 2004, was posted 
on the website of the WTO immediately after finalization.     
The fourth litmus test relates to defining and limiting the policy space to trade-
related areas during the MTNs. Over the last two decades, particularly during the 
Uruguay Round, there was a strong tendency to expand the mandate of the 
WTO to include all kinds of assorted areas, ranging from intellectual property 
rights to labor standards and pollution control. For a while it seemed that any 
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international issue which was not formerly covered by any other supranational 
organizations was considered right for the WTO. Attempts were made to include 
in the ambit of the WTO even those issues for which there were specialized or 
United Nations organizations, like environment and labor issues. Stiglitz and 
Charlton (2005) contended that policy makers employed the prefix “trade related 
aspects of” liberally and excessively in the past.  
The WTO deals with a difficult and important area of multilateral economic life. It 
cannot possibly be made into a negotiating forum and enforcement mechanism 
for all and sundry issues. There is a high price for expanding the policy space of 
the WTO. First, inclusion of many tangential issues tends to confuse and 
overload the WTO system, which has expanded considerably following the 
Uruguay Round and thereafter. Second, it also stretches the analytical and 
negotiating resources of the member developing economies. Third, the industrial 
economies negotiate from a higher platform in the WTO system. Expansion of 
the WTO boundaries gives them an opportunity to use their superior bargaining 
strength in trade negotiations to exploit the developing economies over a larger 
range of issues. The inclusion of the so-called Singapore issues in the Fifth 
Ministerial Conference at Cancún is a case in point. Therefore, expansion of the 
WTO mandate should strictly follow the principle of conservativism, and not 
include issues that do not have a direct relevance to multilateral trade flows.11     
5. Special and Differential Treatment  
The WTO does not have a definition of developing economies, although some 
supranational institutions, like the World Bank, not only provide a closely worded 
definition of developing economies but also of their various sub-groups among 
them. A WTO member decides and declares its status itself. Over the decades, 
the traditional approach of the developing economies has been to seek benefits 
under special and differential treatment (SDT). The term SDT captures the WTO 
provisions that grant preferential access to markets to certain subsets of 
developing economies and gives them exemptions from certain WTO rules, or 
                                                 
11 For a more detailed discussion on this issue refer to Stiglitz and Charlton (2004).  
 20
gives them extra time periods to comply with. The History of SDT is as old as the 
GATT/WTO system itself. It not only existed since the inception of the GATT but 
also had a significant history in the multilateral trading system.  
Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer were the intellectual fathers of the concept of 
SDT. They argued that the exports of the developing economies were 
concentrated in the area of primary products and commodities, which were 
characterized by volatile prices and deteriorating terms-of-trade. Therefore, they 
(along with Ragnar Nurkse) propounded the strategy of import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI) in the 1950s, supported by high rates of protection for the 
developing economies. Although the infant industry argument is accepted by 
economic theory, this group of economists applied it a little too comprehensively. 
Consequently, in the economies that followed the ISI strategy, the infant 
industries remained infants for decades—until many of them touched their middle 
ages. This strategy was avidly followed by South Asian and Latin American 
economies in the 1950s and beyond. They also promoted the notion of 
preferential market access for developing economies in the industrial country 
markets through instruments like SDT. 
In the initial stages SDT was limited to the provisions of Article XVIII of GATT-
1947, which allowed developing economies to void or renegotiate their 
commitments.12 The second defining moment in SDT came during the Kennedy 
Round (1962-67), when Part IV on the benefits to and obligations of the 
developing economies was introduced in the Articles of Agreements of the 
GATT-1947. Article XXXVI of Part IV acknowledged the wide income disparities 
between the developing and industrial economies and emphasized the need for 
                                                 
12 In economics of international trade, the two expressions, namely, the GATT-1947 and the 
GATT-1994, are frequently used. The difference between the two is that that the latter is the 
revised version of the original GATT Agreement of 1947. The text of the Agreement was 
significantly revised and amended during the Uruguay Round and the new version was agreed 
upon in Marrakesh, Morocco. Apparently, the GATT-1994 reflected the outcome of the 
negotiations on issues relating to the interpretations of specific articles. In its renewed version, 
the GATT-1994 includes specific understandings with respect to GATT Articles, its obligations 
and provisions, plus the Marrakesh Protocol of GATT-1994. 
 
 21
rapid economic advancement in the developing economies by means of “a rapid 
and sustained expansion of the export earnings of the less-developed contracting 
parties.”   
The third important period in the life of SDT came during the Tokyo Round (1973-
79), when the Enabling Clause was introduced, which established that the 
developing economies were exempted from Article I {the most-favored-nations 
(MFN) clause} of the GATT-1947.13 The Enabling Clause meant that the 
developing countries should receive more favorable treatment without having to 
reciprocate to the other signing contracting parties (CPs). The reciprocity was 
limited to levels “consistent with development needs” and the developing 
economies were provided with greater freedom to use trade policies than would 
otherwise be permitted under the GATT rules.  
These objectives are covered by Article XVIII of GATT-1947, and subsequently 
GATT-1994. Article XVIII not only permits the developing economies to use their 
trade policies in pursuit of economic development and industrialization but also 
imposes a weaker discipline on them than on the industrial economies in several 
areas of GATT/WTO regulations. It also exhorts the industrial countries to take 
into account the interests of the developing economies in the application of the 
GATT discipline. The Enabling Clause made SDT a central element of the GATT 
system. With prescience, the Enabling Clause also required that, as economic 
development gathers momentum, the developing economies would try and 
improve their capacity to gradually reciprocate concessions. This was christened 
the process of “graduation”. Subsequently, several preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) were created under the Enabling Clause.14  
                                                 
13  Although most-favored nation (MFN) sounds like a contradiction, implying some kind of special 
treatment to a particular trade partner, in the WTO jargon it means non-discrimination. That is, 
treating all trade partners under the WTO regime equally. Each WTO member treats all the WTO 
members as “most-favored” trading partner. If any country improves the market benefits to one 
trading partner, it is obliged to give the same best treatment to all the other WTO members so 
that they all remain “most-favored”. However, historically MFN did not mean equal treatment.      
14 For instance, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI), the Lome Convention, the Cotonou Agreement, the NAFTA Parity Act, the Central 
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The SDT is a system of preferences, which by definition are discriminatory. 
Historically, efforts to operationalize SDT centered on preferential market access 
through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). To maximize the benefits 
of WTO membership, developing economies sought to expand the reach of SDT. 
The benefits of SDT span three important areas, namely, (i) preferential access 
to the industrial economies’ markets without reciprocation, (ii) exemption from 
some WTO obligations, many of which are transitory and some permanent and 
(iii) technical assistance and help in institution building so that the WTO 
obligations can be fulfilled and negotiated decisions are implemented.  
There has been a long standing trend of unilateral discriminatory liberalization, or 
offering tariff- and quota-free market access for the small and poor LDCs. If it is 
fully implemented, it could certainly make the SDT more effective than it was in 
the past. This kind of unilateral market access cannot be offered to the 
developing economies that do not fall under the LDC category, because it is a 
political impossibility in the industrial economies. Therefore, the absolute poor of 
the global economy cannot benefit from it because a large proportion of them live 
in South Asia and Sub-Saran Africa. While all of these economies come under 
the category of developing economies, not all of them are LDCs. This means that 
the absolute poor can only benefit if trade liberalization is made multilateral and 
non-discriminatory. To be sure, such reforms leading to wider and deeper market 
access would allow the developing economies to exploit their comparative 
advantage. Besides, many benefits of free trade accrue to the exporting 
economy through the reform of the domestic macroeconomic framework. That 
being said, as expected by the Enabling Clause, consistent with their 
development needs the middle-income—both lower and upper—developing 
countries should explore the feasibility of exchanging reciprocal concessions with 
                                                                                                                                                 
American Common Market (CACM) and the CARICOM Common Market, are some of the PTAs 
that were created under the Enabling Clause.    
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the industrial economies under the WTO framework, and promote the normal 
trade liberalization process.15 
 
5.1. Beneficiaries of Special and Different Treatment 
The SDT operated for small, low-income developing economies for so many 
decades. Theoretically this concept is unarguably meaningful and significant, but 
in reality it did not engender substantial benefits to the developing economies. 
There were several causes behind this failure. The preferential market access 
schedules under SDT were designed voluntarily by the industrial economies, 
which chose both the eligible countries and products for their schedules. It was 
observed that, for one, the selected countries and products generally lacked 
capacity to export and, secondly, countries and products with export potential 
were excluded from the schedules. Second, when the market preferences were 
granted, the preference schedules were laden with restrictions, product 
exclusions and administrative rules. Three, overall coverage of these schedules 
was only a tiny part of developing country exports, and the eligible countries were 
able to utilize only a small part of the preference granted to them. The exports of 
countries that enjoy the GSP under various preferential schemes form a very 
small part of the European Union (EU) and United States (US) imports. Over the 
preceding three decades, they have ranged between 0.9 percent and 0.4 percent 
of total annual imposts of these the EU and US (WB, 2004). Fourth, the 
preference schedules were characterized by trade diversion, that is, they diverted 
trade with the ineligible developing countries. Finally, the preferential market 
access schedules did not benefit the target group called the absolute poor of the 
world.16 They could not reach this target group at all.   
                                                 
15 We divide the various groups of developing economies according to the World Bank (2004) 
definition, which is available in Classification of Economies on the Internet at 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/countryclass.html. Economies are divided according 
to 2003 per capita gross national income. The groups are: low-income developing countries have, 
$765 or less; lower-middle income, $766 - $3,035; upper-middle income, $3,036 - $9,385; and 
high income, $9,386 or more.  
16 The definition of absolute poor is based on subsistence, the minimum standard needed to live. 
Robert McNamara who coined this term defined it as “a condition of life beneath any reasonable 
standard of human dignity.” There has been a long drawn debate in the discipline regarding 
whether income or consumption poverty lines should be defined in absolute or relative terms. 
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While there were a good number of recipients of SDT’s benefits, not all of them 
benefited from it. The foremost group to benefit from SDT was a small sub-set of 
relatively more advanced developing economies of Asia, which soon acquired 
the status of emerging-market economies (EMEs). The supply-side scenario in 
this small group was better developed than in the other small, low-income 
developing economies, also the rent generated were put to good use by them. 
This group not only had the wherewithal to export the products but also met the 
administrative requirements of the GSP-granting countries well. Preparation of 
the required documents placed by the preference-granting countries was 
efficiently met by them. It was observed that liberal rules of origin (ROO) were a 
critical factor for eliciting a strong response from the potential beneficiary 
economies, particularly in products like textiles and apparel.17 
According to the statistics compiled by the World Bank (2004), in 2001 there 
were 130 countries that were eligible for the SDT, 10 of them accounted for 77 
percent of the US non-oil imports under its GSP. The same 10 countries 
accounted for 49 percent of all GSP imports from all the industrial countries that 
were providing GSP. Occasionally a small developing country did benefit 
substantially from preferential market access where domestic prices were raised 
above the world market prices by tariffs, subsidies or other trade distorting 
mechanisms. For instance Mauritius, which exports sugar and enjoys preferential 
access to the EU markets, benefited a good deal from this opportunity. However, 
these benefits to Mauritius came at a high cost to the EU taxpayers and 
consumers (WB, 2004).           
Recent performance of the GSP beneficiaries again indicated that a small 
number of small developing economies that developed their supply side 
                                                                                                                                                 
Most international organizations define the poverty line in an absolute way as the “level of income 
necessary for people to buy the goods necessary to their survival.” In keeping with this concept, 
the dollar-a-day line, at 1985 purchasing power parity, is being extensively used (Bourgignon, 
1999).  
17 See for instance Brenton (2003) and Brenton and Manchin (2002).  
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capabilities succeed more in exploiting the market access that was provided to 
them under the GSP. A comparison of countries that were eligible for the US 
GSP, and those that were recently graduated from it, revealed that the latter 
category outperformed the former in terms of export performance. Countries that 
were no longer on the GSP eligibility list had a higher ratio of export to GDP ratio, 
as well as higher export growth rate in real terms. One explanation of the 
success of the countries that graduated from the US GSP-eligible list that seems 
rational is that it appears that GSP provided a stimulus to their export industries. 
Causality must be carefully attributed, but GSP seemingly helped the graduating 
countries in engendering supply side capabilities, which strengthened with the 
passage of time and turned them into successful trading economies. The flip side 
of the coin is that merely GSP cannot turn them into successful exporters. 
Reforming their macroeconomic policy structure must have played a decisive role 
in this endeavor.  
 
5.2 Special and Differential Treatment in the Doha Round 
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) again reaffirmed the importance to the 
SDT for the multilateral trade regime and referred to it as “an integral part of the 
WTO agreement” in the Doha Communiqué. The SDT figures at several places 
in the Doha Communiqué. The objective of the DDA in this area is clearly laid 
down in paragraph 2 of the Communiqué as “… we shall continue to make 
positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and specially the 
least-developed among them, secure a share in the world trade commensurate 
with the need of their economic development. In this context, enhanced market 
access, balanced rules, and well-targeted, sustainably financed technical 
assistance and capacity-building programs have important roles to play” (WTO, 
2001). 
Recognizing that SDT has not succeeded in imparting a lot of benefits to the 
target group of beneficiaries, in paragraph 44 participating members called for a 
review of the SDT schedules so that their provisions can be strengthened 
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“making them more precise, effective and operational” so that it is able to fulfill its 
objectives (WTO, 2001). As noted above, the benefits of SDT are provided 
through three different channels. A good case exists for rethinking all the three 
channels so that the benefits can be targeted more precisely for the target 
groups that need them most. In paragraph 14, the Doha Communiqué provided a 
deadline for reestablishing the new modalities of the SDT. The deliberations and 
dialogues on this issue continued all through 2002 and 2003, but without a 
consensus or an agreement. Members were not only divided on important SDT 
matters, but also had opinions that were significantly far apart from each other.  
In view of the fact that the SDT did not spawn large benefits for the target groups, 
academics and policy makers have debated over what shape the SDT should 
take in future so that it is able to meet the expected goals.18 The on-going Doha 
Round negotiations give an additional relevance to this debate, because this is 
an opportunity to refine the SDT system. There is some degree of agreement 
among the researchers on the new shape of STD. Their recommendations are 
comprehensive and are summarized as follows. First, the industrial economies 
need to slash all MFN tariffs on labor-intensive exports from the developing 
economies to 5 percent by 2010, and 10 percent on agricultural exports. The 
target year for the MDG is 2015, by which time all tariffs on exports of 
manufactured products from the developing economies should be eliminated. 
Second, likewise developing economies on their part should reduce their tariff 
barriers on the basis of the adopted formula approach. This would be their 
reciprocation to the measures taken by the industrial economies.  
Third, industrial economies should make binding commitments in trade in 
services to expand temporary excess of services providers by a specific amount, 
say, one percent of the workforce.  
                                                 
18 Some of the recent studies include Oyejide (2002), Hart and Dymond (2003), Hoekman et al 
(2003) and Hoekman et al (2004).  
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Fourth, industrial economies need to unilaterally expand market access for 
LDCs, along with simplification of the ROO requirements. 
Fifth, an affirmation by the WTO regarding core disciplines about the use of trade 
policy, which should apply equally to all the members.  
Sixth, the multilateral trade system needs to explore feasible channels of meeting 
the special institutional development needs of small developing economies and 
LDCs.  
Seventh, there are some WTO agreements that are required to be adopted in 
such a manner that they become supportive of development.  
Eighth, the industrial economies need to meet the trade-related technical 
assistance needs of the small and low-income developing economies.19  
Although none of these proposals are novel and revolutionary, these or similar 
expansion of SDT have been discussed in the past. However, if they are 
deliberated, promoted and adopted during the Doha Round, the final outcome 
would indeed be supportive of development in the low-income developing 
economies and the LDCs. The name DDA would then ring true. Although 
numerous academics have addressed this issue, a Group of Wise Men, like the 
famous Leutwilder Group of eminent persons appointed by the GATT in 1985, 
can be appointed once again to analyze these issues and provide objective and 
functional recommendations that would bring the multilateral trading system 
closer to the DDA mandate.  
 
5.3 The July Framework Agreement and the SDT  
After the failure of the Fifth Ministerial Conference, the so-called framework 
agreement was arrived at during the last week of July 2004. In the framework 
agreement the General Council reaffirms that provisions for SDT are an integral 
part of the WTO agreements. The Council not only reaffirmed the DDA objective 
                                                 
19 Ibid.  
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of strengthening them but also recommended making them more precise, 
effective and operational. The Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) 
reviewed the SDT. The Council instructed the CTD to expeditiously complete the 
review of all the outstanding agreement-specific proposals regarding SDT and 
report to the General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision, by July 
2005. The CTD, within the parameters of the Doha mandate, was asked to 
address all other outstanding work, including on the cross-cutting issues, the 
monitoring mechanism and the incorporation of SDT into the architecture of WTO 
rules. However, the CTD after several meetings failed to make concrete 
recommendations to the WTO General Council. Members had strong 
disagreements on the issues.  
The General Council reviewed and recognized the progress that has been made 
since the beginning of the negotiations of the Doha Ministerial Conference in 
expanding Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) to developing and low-
income countries in transition. In furthering this effort the Council affirms that 
such countries, and in particular the LDCs, should be provided with enhanced 
TRTA and capacity building, to increase their effective participation in the 
negotiations, to facilitate their implementation of WTO rules, and to enable them 
to adjust and diversify their economies. In this context the Council welcomed and 
further encouraged the improved coordination with other agencies, including 
under the Integrated Framework for (IF) TRTA for the LDCs and the Joint 
Integrated Technical Assistance Program (JITAP) (WTO, 2004). This gives an 
impression that the SDT is being taken up for serious review and at the end of 
the Doha Round should emerge stronger than in the past.  
6. Hierarchies of Beneficiaries and Preferential Market Access   
In the hierarchy of beneficiaries from preferential market access, the most 
preferred countries are those that are part of a regional integration agreement 
(RIA) with the preference-granting economy. Trade partners in an RIA commonly 
have close trade and economic ties. This relationship is usually reciprocal in 
nature. The LDCs, which enjoy unilateral preferences or free market access, 
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come next. Other small developing economies with which the preference-
granting economies have GSP relationships are the last. GSP are unilateral in 
nature and are devised for large country groups of beneficiaries in mind. The 
GSP status does not provide free market access, but only reductions in tariff 
rates to the exporting economy in the GSP arrangement. 
Several unilateral preferential market access programs were devised as GSPs by 
the industrial economies as well laid out, structured and customized programs 
that were intended to be carefully implemented. Each one of them had 
characteristic features regarding eligibility criteria, product coverage, and 
administrative rules, in important areas like ROO. Together these criteria 
determine which developing countries are excluded and which can benefit from 
the customized unilateral preferential market access schedule. The programs 
devised and implemented by the US include the African Growth Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Andean Trade Promotion Act, as well 
as several unilateral and reciprocal trade agreements with Israel and Jordan. 
Likewise the principal EU programs include the Cotonou convention which 
includes the African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) countries and the 
Everything-But-Arms (EBA) initiative targeting the LDCs. The EU has also 
entered a large number of unilateral and reciprocal trade agreements with the 
North African, Middle Eastern, and the Mediterranean economies.20          
The characteristic features of the unilateral and reciprocal trade agreements 
differ in several important respects. Several sectors (such as textiles and 
apparel, processed foods, etc.) are treated as “sensitive” items and usually 
excluded from the GSP. They are designed for a large number of potential 
beneficiaries. These sensitive sectors of trade are included in the unilateral and 
reciprocal trade agreements. For instance, by 2009, the EBA initiative will cover 
all the exports of the target group of countries. All the protectionist measures will 
be eliminated for imports into the EU economies from the 50 LDCs. However, an 
unseen restriction in this is that the products that matter most to LDCs (rice, 
                                                 
20 See Das (2004) for these details, in particular Chapter 3, as well as Schiff and Winters (2003). 
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sugar and banana) will not be liberalized until after 2006. Their liberalization 
would begin in 2007 and end in 2009.  Secondly, under the unilateral and 
reciprocal trade agreements administrative requirements tend to be more relaxed 
in comparison to the more comprehensive GSP schemes, particularly regarding 
the ROO.  
Despite recent improvements in the implementation of these programs, as 
alluded to earlier, the overall imports into the industrial economies under various 
preferential schemes have continued to remain diminutive, almost insignificant. 
An exception in this regard is the textiles and apparel exports from small African 
economies that came under the AGOA to the US, which recorded significant 
gains. In 2001, imports by the Quad countries from the GSP beneficiary 
economies amounted to $588 billion, of which $298 billion were subject to normal 
trade and non-trade restrictions, while $184 billion came under various 
preferential trade programs. That is, the coverage of these programs was 38.9 
percent of the eligible exports, which in turn received market access preference. 
In 1991, this proportion was 51.1 percent. Thus the proportion of coverage of 
eligible exports declined during the decade of the 1900s (Inama, 2003). A similar 
quantitative study by Haveman and Shatz (2003) produced comparable, although 
slightly different, evidence of coverage. 
 
7. Small Developing Countries in the Doha Round  
A large number of small and low-income developing countries and LDCs are now 
members of the WTO; together they dominate its membership. Although a 
majority of them belong to the LDC category, there are some that do not come 
under it, such as Kyrgyz Republic, Surinam, Guyana, Tajikistan and the like. 
Cambodia is one such country which became the 148th member of the WTO. 
With growing number, this category of countries acquired a good deal of 
influence in the multilateral trade system and its decision-making process. During 
the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, and the subsequent WTO meeting in 
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Geneva in July 2004, this group held together as the Group-of-Ninety (G-90) and 
was led by Rwanda.  
Two interesting characteristics of small and low-income developing countries and 
LDCs tend to stand out. First, their economies and trade volume are small, if not 
tiny. By definition, each one of them accounts for 0.05 percent, or less, of 
multilateral imports of goods and services. Realistically, such a small trader has 
little to offer in terms of market access concessions to its trading partners during 
the MTNs. This eliminates this group of small developing countries from any 
serious reciprocal bargaining, which is considered central to the WTO operations. 
Second, the interests and trade-related requirements of this group of WTO 
members are imperfectly aligned with the extensive agenda of the multilateral 
trade system. In addition, as these small economies enjoy preferential market 
access to the industrial country markets, further multilateral liberalization in the 
Doha Round would in many cases erode rather than enhance the market access 
of these countries. Many of them would reap few benefits from broadening of the 
WTO mandate. If anything, they might incur substantial costs.21 Owing to these 
two characteristic differences from the principal trading economies, small and 
low-income developing economies stand out as an unusual and exclusive group 
in the multilateral trading system.  
As alluded to in Section 4, the contemporary intellectual and political environment 
strongly favors a “fair” Doha Round outcome for this country group. In such a 
mise-en-scene, the multilateral trading system is faced with the challenge of 
equilibrating two important and seemingly incompatible issues. Accommodating 
the interests and needs of this country group on the one hand and ensuring 
rapid, efficient and expeditious progress in the Doha Round on the other. Stiglitz 
and Charlton, (2005) noted that the primary principle of “the Doha Round should 
be to ensure that the agreements promote development in the poor countries. To 
make this principle operational the WTO needs to foster a culture of robust 
                                                 
21 Several researchers have addressed these issues. See for instance Hoekman et al (2003), and 
Messerlin (2003) and Wolf (2003).  
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economic analysis to identify pro-developmental proposals and promote them to 
the top of the agenda. In practice this means establishing a source of impartial 
and publicly available analysis of the effects of different initiatives on different 
countries. This should be a core responsibility of an expanded WTO Secretariat.”  
The other objective of this analysis would be to reveal that if any WTO 
agreement “differentially hurts developing countries or provides disproportionate 
benefits to developed countries”, it should be regarded as unfair and be 
considered inappropriate for and incompatible with the DDA (Stiglitz and 
Charlton, 2005). In the final analysis the DDA should promote both de facto and 
de jure fairness.       
To be sure, MFN liberalization route is considered both efficient and innovative 
for the Doha Round (See the following Section), but the multilateral trading 
system “faces the classic conflict between efficiency and distribution” (Mattoo 
and Subramanian, 2004). If the MFN-based liberalization is the most efficient for 
reallocation of global resources, it also leads to adverse distributional effect on 
economies that have been granted the benefit of preferential market access. As 
the WTO has followed the GATT tradition of arriving at decisions by consensus, 
this situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the small, low-income, WTO 
member countries in this group have as much say in ensuring the progress of the 
Doha Round and creating an efficient multilateral trading system as a large 
industrial economy member. Without this say the multilateral trading regime 
cannot be egalitarian. To resolve this knotty, if paradoxical, situation Mattoo and 
Subramanian (2004) proposed devising a transfer mechanism for compensating 
the small and low-income WTO members that stand to lose by further 
liberalization of the multilateral trade regime.  
A word about consensus in the GATT/WTO system is relevant here. Although the 
legal requirement of the Marrakesh Agreement (or the GATT-1994) establishing 
the WTO is of two-third or three-fourths majority, depending upon the decision 
being made, while some decisions can only be made by consensus, giving the 
small members economies de jure powers to block any agreement in those 
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areas. In the Doha Round negotiations, this de jure power can be exercised by 
small and low-income developing countries in some categories of issues, while it 
cannot be exercised in others. For instance, it cannot be exercised in issues like 
inclusion of the four Singapore issues which requires two-thirds majority, 
whereas it can be applied to the issue of deepening the WTO rules, which call for 
a consensus. The latter category covers areas like anti-dumping and subsidies 
agreements, and strengthening the framework of the GATT-1994 and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  
However, these de jure powers can have less influence over further market 
access liberalization negotiations. Members that mutually agree can proceed and 
exchange market access concessions without countenance or interference from 
other members, who are less concerned in these areas. Thus, in a lot of areas in 
the DDA agreements can be reached without the apprehension of small 
developing countries blocking them. In addition, this country group has come to 
acquire de facto powers, which stem from the fact that during the Uruguay Round 
they were required to take on numerous obligations, which they subsequently 
found demanding, intricate and costly to implement. Delivering on those 
commitments seemed beyond the institutional and budgetary capabilities of 
these economies. These obligations were in areas like liberalization of trade, 
institutional up-gradation and protection of intellectual property rights. The small 
and low-income members argue that if they are expected to take on arduous 
obligations, they should also have a commensurate influence over the WTO 
affairs. Basically, this is fallacious logic because, for one, small developing 
economies and the LDCs were not the only economies that were asked to take 
on costly obligations, all the participants were. Second, acknowledging their 
special set of circumstances they were given significant latitude and more time 
than other members for fulfilling demanding and stringent WTO obligations.22          
To be sure, a transfer mechanism proposed by Mattoo and Subramanian (2004) 
would be difficult to devise. Even if it is devised, it would be politically infeasible 
                                                 
22 See also Hoekman et al (2002). 
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to implement. If so, then the system would gravitate towards what is feasible, 
albeit less desirable. As regards the question, what is desirable? It is logical to 
say that if this country group consents to let the multilateral trading system move 
forward with the broad liberalization agenda in the DDA, they would be offered a 
quid pro quo in the form of improved non-preferential market access and 
increased technical and financial assistance. Both are valuable and have long-
term significance for this country group. At the present time, the favorite systemic 
response to this knotty riddle that is emerging is as follows: As the financial 
assistance and market access response is seemingly unfeasible, small member 
economies are being relieved of WTO obligations which they see as imposition, 
in the process eliminating their opposition and antagonism to the continuance of 
multilateral trade liberalization under the DDA.             
8. The Doha Round and Global Poverty Alleviation  
As alluded to earlier, one of expectations of the Doha Round is to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of cutting down income poverty by a half 
by 2015. It is the first of the eight MDGs, articulated by the United Nations 
General assembly in 2000. The long-term trend is that the number of absolute 
poor in the world has been rising. During the 19th and the 20th centuries the 
number of poverty stricken people in the world constantly rose (Bouguignon and 
Morrisson, 2002). There was a small reversal in this trend after 1970, and this 
number fell by a tad over 200 million. Measured in 1985 PPP terms, the number 
of poor had declined by 350 million (Sala-i-Martin, 2002). Impressive as this 
achievement seems, there were still 1.2 billion in the world, or one person in five, 
still lived in poverty (Collier and Dollar, 2002).  
 
It should be noted that while the linkage between poverty alleviation and social 
sector reforms—like education, health, land reform, micro-credit, infrastructure 
development and governance—is direct, trade and poverty alleviation are not 
directly linked. However, economic theory suggests that trade can certainly 
favorably affect the poor through its positive effect on the GDP and per capita 
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income in an economy. Trade liberalization and expansion have both static and 
dynamic impact over the economy and create optimal conditions for rapid growth 
through flows of better ideas, technology transfer, goods, services and capital. 
More importantly, trade expansion underpins growth through better resource 
allocation in the domestic economy. However, it cannot be ignored that growth is 
a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for poverty alleviation. Even when trade 
liberalization and expansion lead to rapid GDP growth, it does not and cannot 
ensure improvement in income inequality in the economy. But higher GDP 
growth decisively enhances the probability of poverty alleviation. As wage 
inequality decreases as a consequence of trade expansion, poverty level decline. 
Liberalization of multilateral trade in line with the mandates of the DDA is widely 
expected to contribute to alleviating poverty and achieving the MDGs.23 In the 
Asian economies, the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled workers 
narrowed in the decades following trade liberalization in Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Malaysia, although evidence in the Philippines was mixed.  
 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem can provide meaningful guidance over trade 
liberalization leading to poverty alleviation. In the medium- and long-term, 
increase in return to labor and capital employed in one sector—one having 
comparative advantage—should logically attract more resources to that sector. It 
would also raise gains for labor and capital going to this particular sector. If this 
sector of the economy is relatively labor-intensive, a rise in the prices of the 
output of this sector is sure to raise the economy-wide wages of labor. It would 
benefit all wage earners, skilled and unskilled, and also those directly or indirectly 
employed in the sector in question. This is more likely to be the long-term impact 
of trade liberalization. While this holds as a generalization, empirically linking 
multilateral trade liberalization to poverty requires a multi-region approach. As 
most household surveys are country specific, they are not the most ideal tools for 
multi-region models used for trade policy analysis (Reimer, 2002). To circumvent 
this problem, most empirical studies that quantify the impact of trade 
                                                 
23 Refer to two recent works of Winters (2000b) and McCulloch et al (2001). 
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liberalization over poverty focus on the impact on the average or per capita 
income.       
 
According to the most recent estimates made by Chen and Ravallion (2004), 
1,039 million people live below the poverty line globally if the reference poverty 
line is defined as $1.08 dollars a day, and 2,736 billion if it is defined as $2.15 a 
day. The largest proportions of population living below the poverty line are to be 
found in South Asia (31.3 percent) and sub-Saharan Africa (36.9 percent). China 
made the most impressive strides in reducing the proportion of population living 
below the poverty line. Between 1981 and 2001, this proportion declined from 
63.8 percent to 16.6 percent.24   
 
For analyzing the impact of multilateral trade reform at a global level, applied 
general equilibrium (AGE) models were found a useful tool in the past. Whalley 
(1985) and Martin and Winters (1996) put this tool to good use in the context of 
the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, respectively. AGE models capture the 
detailed interactions across the many agents of an economy, which includes 
producers, consumers, public entities, investors, exporters, and exporters. 
Despite their level of representation, they present a stylized representation of an 
economy. For instance the version of model used for WB (2002) represented 
economic activity by only 20 goods and services sectors. This analysis 
decomposed the world economy into 15 regions and 20 economic activities. The 
model was calibrated to the latest release of the Global Trade Analysis Program 
(GTAP) dataset with a 1997 base year.        
 
According to a World Bank (2002) estimates, success in the Doha Round would 
lift 320 million out of absolute poverty. That is, it could cut the number of people 
living in poverty by 8 percent by 2015. Besides, it can potentially lift global 
income by $2.8 trillion by 2015. Of this, $1.5 trillion would accrue to the 
                                                 
24 See Chen and Ravallion (2004), Table 2 and Table 3.  
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developing economies.25 Hertel et al (2004) developed a micro-simulation model 
to assess impact of trade liberalization on household income. They posited that 
“in the short run household incomes will be differentially affected by global trade 
liberalization, depending on their reliance on sector-specific factors of 
production.” Their methodology was applied to an assessment of the 
consequences of global trade liberalization in the following sectors: merchandise 
tariffs, agricultural export subsidies, and quotas on textiles and apparel. This 
study focused on Indonesia and concluded that the national headcount measure 
of poverty declines following global trade liberalization both in the short- and 
long-term. In the long-run the poverty headcount in Indonesia fell for all strata of 
poverty. Increased demand for unskilled workers lifted income for the formerly 
self-employed, some of whom moved into the wage labor market. Thus viewed, 
successful rounds of MTNs do have a discernible favorable impact on the 
incidence of poverty.   
 
9. Conclusions and Summary  
The global community’s commitment to the goals of economic growth and 
poverty alleviation is an old one. The Millennium Development Goals is the 
newest manifestation of the same objective. Research over the last two-and-a-
half decades has led trade analysts and economists to believe that trade 
expansion is strongly correlated with growth. Although the WTO is not a 
development institution, its operations have definite development relevance.  
There are certain facets of the WTO mandate that decisively influence 
developmental endeavors of countries. The system of ruled-based conduct 
provided by the WTO reduces uncertainties in the multilateral trade arena, which 
in turn helps in promoting multilateral trade and domestic investment at lower 
risk. Over the GATT era, the developing economies largely remained inactive 
participants in the multilateral trading system. For the first time, during the 
Uruguay Round, and thereafter, the developing economies became active 
                                                 
25 See the World Bank (2002), Chapter 6.  
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participants in the multilateral trade regime. The old GATT mindset began to 
change. They also became more proactively involved in multilateral trade. Since 
then, participation of the developing economies in the multilateral trade forum 
has progressively become more consequential.  
As the Doha Round is intended to be a development round, development 
concerns were an integral part of the Doha Ministerial Communiqué. The Group-
of-twenty (G-20) developing economies, which was born in Cancún, played a 
consequential role both at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún and at the 
WTO meeting in held in Geneva in the last week of July 2004, which put together 
the so-called July Package or the July Framework Agreement. The 
developmental concern did not lose its relevance after the July Framework 
Agreement was designed. 
Special and differential treatment (SDT) was devised to exclusively assist the 
small and low-income developing economies. In the initial stages SDT was 
limited to the provisions of Article XVIII of GATT-1947, which allowed developing 
economies to void or renegotiate their commitments. SDT remained an important 
part of the subsequent MTNs and the multilateral trade regime. The WTO 
members participating in the Doha Round called for a review of the SDT 
schedules so that their provisions can be strengthened making them more 
precise, effective and operational so that they are able to fulfill their objectives. In 
paragraph 14, the Doha Communiqué provided a deadline for reestablishing the 
new modalities of the SDT. The deliberations and dialogues on this issue 
continued all through 2002, but without a consensus or decision. In view of the 
fact that the SDT did not spawn large benefits for the target groups, academics 
and policy makers have debated over what shape the SDT should take in future 
so that it is able to meet the expected goals. The on-going Doha Round 
negotiations give an additional relevance to this debate, because this is an 
opportunity to refine the SDT system.  After the failure of the Fifth Ministerial 
Conference, the framework agreement was arrived at during the last week of July 
2004. According to this agreement, the General Council not only reaffirmed the 
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DDA objective of strengthening the SDT but also making them more precise, 
effective and operational. 
 
A large number of small and low-income developing countries and LDCs are now 
members of the WTO; together they dominate its membership. The 
contemporary intellectual and political environment strongly favors a “fair” Doha 
Round outcome for this country group. In such a mise-en-scene, the multilateral 
trading system is faced with the challenge of equilibrating two important and 
seemingly incompatible issues.  
 
Historically, developing economies reluctantly traded with other developing 
economies and maintained high tariff and non-tariff barriers against each other. 
Consequently, intra-developing country trade remained low in volume and value. 
The developing economies preferred to focus on opening up access to industrial 
country markets. This penchant underwent a transformation in the 1990s. 
Developing economies grew faster than the industrial economies and transition 
economies. The growth rate of intra-developing country trade was twice as fast 
as that of world trade during the 1990-2001 period. Recent long-term forecasts 
show that the developing economies would continue to grow faster than the 
industrial and transitional economies during the coming decade (2003-2015). It is 
a realistic expectation that the intra-developing country trade would continue to 
grow in the medium term at a more rapid pace than multilateral trade.  
 
 
Success in the Doha Round can certainly influence the absolute poor of the 
world favorably. An empirical study estimated that it would lift 320 million out of 
absolute poverty. That is, it could cut the number of people living in poverty by 8 
percent by 2015. Besides, it can potentially lift global income by $2.8 trillion by 
2015. Of this, $1.5 trillion would accrue to the developing economies. Another 
study projected that in the short run household incomes will be differentially 
affected by global trade liberalization, depending on their reliance on sector-
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specific factors of production. This study focused on Indonesia and concluded 
that the national headcount measure of poverty would decline following global 
trade liberalization both in the short- and long-term. In the long-run the poverty 
headcount in Indonesia fell for all strata of poverty. Increased demand for 
unskilled workers lifted income for the formerly self-employed, some of whom 
moved into the wage labor market. Thus viewed, successful rounds of MTNs do 
have a discernible favorable impact on the incidence of poverty.   
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